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 Maria V. Semenova
Research Assistant,
Economics
of
“Unusual”
Institutions
Contacts:
E-mail:
msemenova@hse.ru
Address: Myasnitskaya, 20,
101000, Moscow, office 237
State University – Higher School
of Economics
Laboratory for Institutional
Analysis of Economic Reforms
Office hours - Monday,
15.00-17.00
Education
2005 – p.t.
State University – Higher School
of Economics (SU-HSE), Russia,
Moscow.
Department of Economics
Master's degree in Economics
(Banking)
2001 – 2005
State University – Higher School
of Economics (SU-HSE), Russia,
Moscow.
Department of Economics
Bachelor's degree in Economics
(Banking, honors degree)
2003 – 2005
Additional to the Bachelor’s
degree, Educational program "The
translator in the sphere of
Economics (from English into
Russian)".
Professional interests
Institutional analysis of banks
and banking.
- “Bank-borrower” relationship
- “Bank-depositor” relationship
Credit bureau as an institution
of information intermediation in
the bank loans market
Deposit insurance system as a
solution for moral hazard
problem in the bank deposits
market
Market discipline in the bank
deposits market
Official responsibilities
“Economics of University”
project - editor, coordinator
LIA Working Paper series
(preprints) - coordinator
Current research
Market discipline mechanisms at
bank deposits market
Any market is governed by two
types of mechanisms: intrinsic,
generated by the market itself,
and external, used by regulatory
and supervision authorities.
These two types of instruments
can solve moral hazard problem
in bank deposit market as well.
On the one hand, there is a
certain number of standards and
requirements, which are aimed to
control the riskiness of the
bank operations and to ensure
bank’s asset liquidity and
deposits repayment.
On the other hand no depositors
would take their money to the
bank of questionable liquidity
and solvency they are not sure
about. The second observation
describes the mechanism of
market discipline. But can
regulatory and supervision
authorities fully rely on it
concerning the market of
personal deposits? To answer
this questions I’m intended to
§
To investigate whether any
mechanism of market discipline
exists in the Russian market of
personal time deposits, and if
it does, which type of the
mechanisms is the most
articulated one (whether
depositors punish banks for
increased risks by withdrawing
their deposits, by demanding for
higher interest rates or by
switching from long-term to
short-term or even on-call
deposits).
§
To test if any characteristics
of market discipline in personal
time deposit market depend on:
o
the fact that the bank is a
state one.
o
the fact that the majority of
the bank’s ownership is in the
hands of foreign financial
structure.
§
To check up if there were any
changes in depositors’
sensitivity to bank
fundamentals’ deterioration (or
improvement) after the
introduction of deposit
insurance systems with
obligatory participation and
state guarantee for the amount
of deposit under 100000RUB and
90% of the next 100000RUB of
deposit.
The latter problem is one of
current importance: the process
of bank selection for the state
deposit insurance system came to
the end, the “ceiling” of the
amount, guaranteed by the state,
was raised to 190000RUB. Should
we expect this measure to make
the depositors even less
sensitive to banks’ riskiness?
Or this step is a necessary one,
because the market initially was
not able to deal with the moral
hazard problem itself? It is
evident that this study seems to
be appropriate and relevant in
the light of some current
reforms in Russian banking
system.
Grants and awards
Research grant (Economic
Education and Research
Consortium,
www.eerc.ru)
Project: How depositors
discipline banks: the case of
Russia.
Conferences
Conference on Risk, Regulation
and Competition: Banking in
Transition Economies
Ghent University, Belgium, 1-2
of September, 2006 (presentation
of paper «Information sharing in
credit markets: incentives for
incorrect information
reporting»)
Papers in English
“Information Sharing in Credit
Markets: Incentives for
Incorrect Information
Reporting”, Working Paper
(presented at
Conference on Risk, Regulation
and Competition: Banking in
Transition Economies,
Ghent University, Belgium, 1-2
of September, 2006)
Abstract
The introduction of institutions
of credit information sharing -
private credit bureaus and
public credit registries - in
the market for bank loans
represent one of the possible
solutions of information
asymmetry problem, - the problem
which the creditors tend to
face. However the possibility of
information sharing influences
the bank's incentives in two
different ways. While it
disciplines the borrowers and,
therefore, reduces the share of
bad loans, a bank loses the
competitive advantage, namely
the monopolistic knowledge about
the data in its clients' credit
histories. Does the bank have an
opportunity at its disposal to
use the benefits of information
sharing without losing its
competitive advantage and its
clientele? One way to do so is
to report false data on
borrowers. This paper analyses
the bank's incentives for such
opportunistic behavior and
describes the impact of false
information reporting on the
characteristics of market
equilibrium. The opportunity to
get extra profit and to offer
less expensive credit to new
clients explains why banks
prefer the strategy of dishonest
behavior. This paper outlines
the role of the informational
intermediary in quality control
for the data, contained in
credit reports. Also, it
describes the conditions under
which verification of a certain
share of reports provides that
the parameters characterizing
the equilibrium are equal to
those in no information
asymmetry situation.
Download
Papers
in
Russian
"Èíôîðìàöèîííûé îáìåí íà ðûíêå
áàíêîâñêîãî êðåäèòîâàíèÿ: ïðàâäà
– õîðîøî, à ñ÷àñòüå – ëó÷øå",
èþíü 2005 (WP10/2005/01)
Download PDF
Áàðð Í., "Âûñøåå îáðàçîâàíèå:
ñïîñîáû è èñòî÷íèêè
ôèíàíñèðîâàíèÿ" (ïåðåâîä ñ
àíãë.), Âîïðîñû îáðàçîâàíèÿ, 2,
2005
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